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CHAPTER I

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE STUDY

The control function of management is the process of making sure
the objectives of a company are achieved.

In small business organiza

tions this function can be performed by direct or face-to-face contact
of management alone.

However, in large and complex organizations en

gaged in the manufacture of different products in plants spread over a
wide geographical area, the informal system becomes inadequate. In such
organizations, an effective information system is needed to provide con
trol over the separate operating units.

In recent years, increased

attention has been directed toward placing separate operating units on
a profit center basis, although other systems are frequently used.

A

profit center system provides a measure of performance which can be used
by top management in controlling the resources of the organization or
the operating unit.

In some cases, it is hard to measure the profit of

separate operating units because of the difficulty of measuring inter
company sales or transfers, but by using a system of transfer pricing
profit can be measured and business organizations can achieve the de
sired control.

I.

THE STUDY

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study isg

(l) to examine the methods of ac

counting for transfers of products and services between separately
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organized units of a company (transfer pricing), so that the objectives
of a profit center can be achieved, and (2) to investigate the applica
tion of transfer pricing in a specific organization.

Validation of the Study
In stressing the validity of this study, it is necessary to show
the advantage of a profit center in comparison to a commonly used con
trol system—-an expense center.

After this is substantiated, an explan

ation will be presented showing how important transfer pricing methods
are in establishing a profit center.
In a profit center, a relationship is established between inputs
(expenses) and outputs (revenues).

In an expense center, the only con

cern is with inputs, or the expenses incurred to produce the output.
Thus, an expense center does not provide a measure of profitability as
is accomplished by a profit center.

For this reason, even though the

expense center may be operating efficiently, it is not known whether or
not the center is adequately contributing to the organization's profit.
The system of information (the measurement of profit), supplied by a
profit center, is therefore more extensive and provides a better con
trol system.
In many companies, growth has been accompanied by greater inte
gration of operations.

An integrated company is one which performs

operations on more than one stage of the production of the product.

In

an integrated company, raw materials and products would be transferred
from one operating unit to another, as successive manufacturing or mar
keting steps are performed.

This raises the problem of accounting for

transfers between these units. In many cases, competitive market prices
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cannot be used because they may not exist for items transferred between
operating units.

These items may be completely unique, or they may not

lend themselves to outside sales, because they are used as components
in another product.

Therefore, in such cases, an approximation of a

competitive price must be arrived at.

Only when realistic transfer

prices can be established is it possible to use divisional profit as a
system of information in a control process.

Limitations
This study is designed to show transfer pricing methods and their
usefulness in management control.

The discussion will not consider the

external consolidated financial reporting aspects of transfer pricing
for stockholders and other third parties.

If this were the case, trans

fers would probably be priced at cost in order to reflect the stockhold
ers® point of view.

Stockholders view these transfers between operating

units as just a movement of items, and any profit made on these transfers
should not be included in the consolidated report.

In the past, finan

cial reporting considerations were often the determining factor in se*lecting a basis for pricing transfers.

While this point of view may

still exist in some companies, this study is not designed to consider
this aspect.
The present study was conducted to investigate the application of
transfer pricing in a specific organization, and the conclusions are
applicable only to the particular company studied.

The discussion in

National Association of Cost Accountants, Accounting for Intracompany Transfers (Research Series No. 30? New York 2 The Macmillan
Company, 1956), p. 21.
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Chapter II will indicate that solutions to proper income measurement and
suitable transfer pricing methods, can be explored only in context with
specific organizational objectives.

II.

ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OP THE PAPER

Chapter II consists of a review of decentralization and transfer
pricing methods.

The objectives of top management in a decentralized

company are established first.

Then divisional profit measurement and

transfer pricing methods are examined as means of achieving decentralized
objectives of a company.
The first part of the case study is presented in Chapter III.
The structure of the organization is described, and the existing control
process is examined and evaluated.
Chapter I? is devoted to investigating the application of transfer
pricing in an operating unit of this company, so the objective of profit
decentralization can be met.
The study is summarized and the final conclusions are made in
Chapter Y.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATTJRE

In the past twenty years, the increased pressure by large com
panies for more effective control tools has encouraged research and
writing in the areas of decentralization and transfer pricing, both by
educators and others who have studied or struggled with problems in
these areas.

The following is a review of these two related subjects.

I.

OBJECTIVE OF DECENTRALIZATION

Delegation of Authority
As companies have moved into new fields of operation accompanied
by expanded product lines or wider sales regions, their organizational
structure has changed.

The centralized functional-type organization

which so well fitted the single-product company has been replaced in many
instances by divisionalization and decentralization.

Divisionalization

usually means grouping functions on a product or geographical basis into
smaller organizational units«

Decentralization results from the delega

tion of certain chief executive responsibilities to managers of operating
units.•*"
In a centralized functional-type organization it is difficult for
a single manufacturing executive to deal with all the different manufac-

%arold Stieglitz, "Patterns in Organization Structuring," Manage
ment t A Book of Readings, Harold Koontz and Cyril O'iQonnell, editors
(New York? McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196k), p. 188.
5
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taring problems associated with a variety of different products; and,
likewise, it is difficult for the single sales manager to cope with all
the problems associated with the sales of different products.

It is

even more difficult for one man, the chief executive, to assume respons
ibility for the overall coordination of production, sales, and adminis
tration of a complex business enterprise.

This is what often occurs in

a centralized, functional-type organization.

Also, functional special

ists tend to become too concerned about their own areas (and those alone).
For example, the sales department might not be very conscious of its
relationship to the manufacturing operation, or to total company profit
performance.

Cost may not become a prime consideration, as long as new

services (such as the hiring of new salesmen) increases to some degree
the perfection or importance of the sales function.
In a decentralized company (which inherently includes divisional
ization), coordination of functions is in the hands of people in the
lower levels of the organization, who are closer to the actual problems.
These people can make a decision with a better understanding of the pos
sible implications of their action.

By setting up smaller organizational

units, the relationship between efficiency and functional perfection is
also more readily apparent.

In general, the objective of decentralization

is to achieve the advantage of smallness for effective control and
•>

efficient operation.

2
Marshall K. Evans, "Accounting Problems in Measuring Performance
by Organizational Units," National Association of Cost Accountants Bul
letin, XTOI (August, 1955), 17U1.
3lbid.
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A decentralized company still needs control tools,,

Without such

tools, top management can not determine whether the performance of the
manager to whom responsibility and authority have been delegated is
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

One system which has been used to con

trol decentralized authority is the profit center.

Profit Center as a Control System for Decentralization
A profit center is a serai-independent division headed by a man
ager who is responsible for the coordination of functions relating to
li
the profit of the division.

Thus, the division must have the necessary

elements to generate a performance measure—a net profit.

In other

words, costs and revenues mast be both definable and measurable for the
division.
1.

In general, profit measurement has three objectivess
Main guide to evaluation—profit serves as the main guide to
evaluation,of divisional management by top management, and
the main guide by which the division manager makes his deci
sions.

2.

Guide to goal agreement—profit should also link the goals
of top management with the goals of the division managers so
that each profit center, in maximizing its own profits, will
do that which will maximize the profit of the entire company.

3.

Measure of profitability—divisional profit performance also

Donald DeFrancesco, "The Accounting Side of Profit-Center
Organization," Management Accounting, XLVTII (December, 1966), 56-57.
For the purposes of this discussion the terms "profit center" and
"division" will be used interchangeably hereafter,,
^Gordon Shillinglaw, "Toward a Theory of Divisional Income
Measurement," Accounting Review, XXXVII (April, 1962), 210.
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serves as a guide in future resource allocation decisions.
If divisional income is poor and efforts to increase it are
•A
unrewarding, then presumably future resources will be di
verted to other areas.
For a profit center to achieve these objectives, it is necessary
to;
1.

Consider the assignment of responsibility.

2.

Consider the freedom to deal outside the company.

3.

Measure profit correctly.

It.

Establish sound transfer prices.

The assignment of responsibility.

Some businessmen argue that

the profit center manager should be given complete responsibility for
the coordination of functions relating to profit in order to make profit
decentralization effective.

Others feel there must be some broad re-

structions or policies set by top management, for if managers are left
on their own, they will seek only to maximize their own profit and not
that of the company in general.

This reason stems from the fact that

managers are evaluated by how successful they are within their "own
divisions."
As a guide, division managers must be held responsible for only
that which they control.

If a division manager is held accountable for

the level of output, he must have full authority to determine that level.
Likewise, unless he has full authority to make the decisions which affect
profit maximization, he can not be expected to maximize profit.

For

instance, the interests of the company might be better served by having
top management retain a portion of the authority to determine divisional

9
policies and make some decisions at the divisional level, but if this
is the case, the responsibility of the division manager in maximizing

6

profit performance is also limited.

It would be unwise to hold that one approach is right and the
other wrong in all situations.

The degree of responsibility can be

based only upon the objective of top management through decentralization.

The freedom to deal outside the company.

Included in many discus

sions on transfer pricing, is the idea that the selling (manufacturing)
and buying divisions should treat each other as though they were inde
pendent companies.

This would require the manufacturing division to

compete with other companies for sales to the buying division, and would
give the buying division the right to decide which source will produce
the item.

John Dearden' feels that it is neither desirable nor practic

able for divisions to treat each other as though they were independent
companies.

The cost of idle facilities would be considerable if the

buying division placed its order outside the company.

In analyzing who

should decide which source will produce the item and how it should be
priced, Mr. Dearden classifies all items sold within a company according
to the possibility of buying them from an outside company.

The cate

gories are;
A.

Items that will probably never be produced by an outside
supplier.

^Lennis M. Knighton, "Transfer Pricing to Maximize Profit Objec
tives," Business Topics, XIII (Autumn, 1965)* 73 =
7
'John Dearden, "Interdivisional Pricing," Management Control
Systems, Robert M. Anthony, John Dearden and Richard F. Vancil, editors
(Homewood, Illinoiss Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 265-272.

B.

Items for which a change from manufacturing to buying or
vice versa mast be made on a more or less long-term basis.

C.

Items for which the source may be changed on a short-terra
basis.

Because class A items will probably never be produced by an outside
supplier, class B and G items only will be discussed,.
Mr. Dearden concludes that the manufacturer of class B items,
which require a substantial investment, should be determined by a cen
tral staff group and any changes in sources of supply be made by matual
agreement or arbitrated by the central group.

Prices on these items,

to promote efficiency, should be at current competitive levels, adjusted
for any short-term abnormalities.

If difficulty arises in determining

competitive price, alternative transfer prices, which will be discussed

8

in the next major section of this chapter, can be used.

In the case of class C items, which involve a relatively small
investment of plant and equipment, the selling and buying divisions
would together decide on who should produce the product.

The prices on

these items should be established and maintained on the basis of current
competitive levels.

The selling division would have the right to appeal

to the central group if it feels that what the buying division wants to
do is contrary to company interests.

This would not be true, of course,

9
if the selling division cannot meet the current competitive price.
In most situations, the ideal of letting the divisions have
complete freedom to deal outside does not exist, but here again the

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.
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determining factor is the company's objectives with respect to decen
tralization and control.

Measure profit correctly.

A reliable measure of profit is also

essential to achieve the objectives of a profit center.
mast be considered in profit measurement areg

Two areas which

(1) allocation of the

costs of company service units, and (2) determination of transfer prices.
The allocation of the costs of company service units (such as
home office, and research and development) to the divisions tends to be
arbitrary.

Some business firms feel the division manager has no control

over these costs and should not be held responsible for them.

Others

feel they must be included to give an accurate profit figure. This
point might be more significant, if comparisons on profit performance
were to be made with similar outside companies. The profit figure of
each division will differ depending on which approach is taken.

If these

costs are not allocated, the profit figures of the divisions will be
higher than if they are allocated.
The second area to consider in establishing a reliable measure
of profit is the pricing of goods transferred between divisions (intracompany transfers).

Determining a price which will be fair to both

divisions is vital because this price will be directly related to the
profit of each division.

Because of its importance, the establishment

of a sound transfer price will be1 discussed in the following sections.
Another aspect to consider in measuring profits correctly is
that division managers will maximize that for which they are motivated.
Therefore, top management must create an atmosphere and measure profits
in such a way as to avoid placing too much emphasis on current profit
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performance.

Activities of the profit center must be directed so as to

assure long-terra gains are not destroyed because of eagerness to earn
short-term profits.

This may require looking beyond the limits of profit

reports by top management.

It may consist of setting standards and goals

for divisions to reach which involve a consideration of other activities,
such as share of market, utilization of capacity, and improved production
piethods."'"®

Of course, the determining fact on correct profit measurement

depends on the type of organization, the circumstances within which it
operates, and the objective of top management in profit measurement or
dec entralization.

Establishing a sound transfer price.

As mentioned earlier, the

problem of transfer pricing is really part of the problem of measuring
divisional profit correctly.

Transfer pricing, or the determination of a

proper valuation of goods transferred from one profit center to another,
is probably the most difficult problem in income measurement for decen
tralized operations? and it is for this reason that transfer pricing
methods are so important.

In appraisal of transfer pricing methods, the

most important test is the extent to which the method promotes agreement
between division and overall company goals.

Without this consideration,

the system will not promote efficient action among profit center managers

11

in maximizing company profit.

II.

ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER PRICING METHODS

Prom the standpoint of profit measurement, there are two ideal
profit centers.

The first is one which sells and buys entirely outside

^Knighton, op. cit., p. 75°

UIbld,

the company, having no transactions with other profit centers within the
company.

The other ideal profit center is one whose product is a compe

titive good.

This product has an established market price, as it is

sold by many producers in the open market„

In both these cases, divi

sional profit determination is relatively simple«,

Regrettably, these

two situations can only be classified as ideal cases, for many profit
centers trade exclusively with other divisions in their own company,
and the products which are transferred are those which do not have an
established market price.

Setting a value for the goods transferred

from one center to another in these cases requires determining a suit
able transfer price.

In lieu of a competitive price, a market-based

negotiated, or cost-based pricing method must be used*

Market-based Prices
A market-based transfer price is an estimate of what the actual
price would be if the product were sold outside the company„

It is

considered a fair price because it puts each profit center in the same
position it would occupy if it were an independent company.,

Although

there are probably many different methods used to estimate a market
price, depending on the stage the product is in, one method which can
be used by many companies is asking for bids, or price quotations from
outside companies.
In asking for bids, outside prospective suppliers mast know they
will receive at least part of the business they are bidding on, if they
outbid the division Mthin the company.

In other words, these possible

suppliers will not prepare a realistic bid for business they will not
get, no matter what their bid„

In some cases, it might be a good practice

Ik
to give some of the business to the lowest outside bidder, even though
12
the division within the company was the low bidder.

Without this

consideration, this technique will not be successful in approximating
competitive prices.
In other instances, quoted prices by prospective outside suppliers
may reflect (1) the desire to obtain an initial order, or (2) ignorance
of cost.

This price would tend to be temporary and not valid to use as
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a transfer price for the manufacturing profit center.

Thus, market-

price data obtained in this manner must be interpreted with sound
judgment.
Another method which could be used in setting an estimated market
price is to adjust the market price of a product which is similar.

With

out adjusting this price it would be unfair to either the manufacturing
or buying division, depending on whether the quality of the similar
product was inferior or superior.

For example, if the product were

superior, the transfer price would be too high and the buying division
would be paying too much for the product.
A market price could also possibly be estimated for a product
which is in some stage of its development.

This price could be derived

by subtracting from the price of the finished good, those costs (includ
ing profits) added after the stage of development, on the product for
which the transfer price is desired®

12

Robert Kf„ Anthony, "Notes on Transfer Pricing," Management Con
trol Systems, op. cit., p0 259.
•^National Association of Cost Accountants, Accounting for Intracompany Transfers (Research Series No. 3O5 New Yorks The Macmillan Com
pany, 1956), p. 26.
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A market-based transfer price which is unstable in many cases is
not a good transfer price.

The manufacturing division will be trying

to maximize its profits by making transfers when the transfer price is
high, and the buying division will be trying to maximize profits by
buying transfers when the price is low.

The division with the most

bargaining power will show a better profit, but action of this type
(increasing profit at the expense of another division) will not neces1)
sarily increase the entire company's profit.

If the manufacturing

division is required to transfer its product as soon as it is finished,
this problem can be eliminated.

But in this case, the division manager's

control over profit performance would be limited.
The availability and reliability of market-based prices vary
widely in different circumstances, and as a consequence, they mast be
interpreted and used with good judgment.

negotiated Prices
Negotiation is another method used to estimate a market price,
but because of its significance it is discussed separately.

A negotiated

transfer price is set when managers of the concerned divisions meet in
negotiation to determine a market price which is mutually acceptable,.
This method seems fair in that it produces a price which the manufactur
ing division could receive if it sold the product outside the company,
but in certain instances it can be unsatisfactory.

In the first place,

when two divisions enter into negotiation, a considerable amount of time

^Robert K. McLain, "Transfer Pricing Can Contribute to Divisional
Performance Evaluation," National Association of Accountants Bulletin,
XLI7 (August, 1963), 31.
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might be spent before a price is agreed upon, and this in itself might
be a great waste „

In the second place, negotiation may not produce a

price which is equitable or realistic, because the divisions may not be
in equal bargaining positions„

The absence of outside sales markets or

purchase opportunities would complicate the establishing of an equitable
transfer price.

Therefore, some method of arbitration to quickly

solve the disputes that arise, and a system to insure equitable trans
fer prices must necessarily be considered before adopting this method0

Cost-based Prices
Gost can also be used as a basis for pricing intra-company
transfers.

Where this is the case, costs used are defined in a variety

of ways to fit the purpose management wants to accomplish,,

Full cost,

marginal cost and cost plus will be discussed.
Mien full cost is used as a transfer price it includes all the
costs associated with producing the product, including allocated general
administration, research, and advertising expenses charged to the di
vision by the central office.

In most cases, full cost should be a

standard or predetermined cost.

If it is not, the manufacturing divi

sion will have no incentive to control costs, for recovery is assured
in the transfer price.

If an appropriate and accurate standard cost is

used, inefficiencies will have to be accounted for by the manufacturing
division,,^
Where fall cost is used, the transfer price equals the costj and
the operating unit can not be evaluated as a profit center because there

•^Knighton, 0£«> c i t o » p . 11»

^Anthony, og. eit., p» 260„
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is no profit included in the transfer price.

There are two situations

tfhere a transfer price which equals cost may be useful.

One case is

when transfers between units are so insignificant that cost, the simplest
method of accounting for such transfers, is used.

The other situation

is when it is not practical to evaluate the operating unit as a profit
center, because it does not lend itself to profit calculation or evaluation®

A good example is a research and development department

17

It might also be beneficial to base the transfer price on marginal
or incremental costs, when idle capacity exists0

This method is a short-

run pricing technique, because products are sold at prices with return
something less than a full share of fixed cost^®

But in this case also

the operating unit can not be evaluated as a profit center.
When cost plus a fair return is used as a transfer price, an
amount is added to cost to provide a profit for the product transferred„
The cost, as mentioned above, should be standard cost, because by using
it there will be an incentive to control costs«

In order to provide an

incentive to reduce costs, there should be a mechanism to insure that
the manufacturing division will benefit from new methods which improve
efficiency.

One solution will be to leave the standard cost unchanged

19

for a period of time after the new method for reducing costs is in use..

Consequently, by reducing its cost, the manufacturing division increases
its profit, during the period of time the standard cost is left unchanged,,

^William Lo Felix, Jr0, "Intracorspany Pricing," (unpublished
Master's thesis, University of Montana, Missoula, 1965)> p° 11«
^National Association of Cost Accountants, o£<, cit.» p„ 36„
•^Anthony, ioc<, cite
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Without these incentives to control and reduce costs, the cost
plus method will be of little value in setting a transfer price, because
the buying division will not be evaluated independently of the selling
division.

In other words, part of the buying division's profit perform

ance will be based on how efficient the manufacturing division is in
producing the product.

III.

SMART

After consideration of the objectives of top management in a de
centralized company, two areas were examined, (1) how these objectives
can be met through the use of divisional profit performance, and (2)
transfer pricing methods used in calculating divisional profit.

Through

out the chapter an attempt has been made to show that the measurement of
profit, along with the determination of transfer prices, is a function
of only the objectives of the decentralized organization.

CHAPTER III

EXAMINATION OP A CONTROL SYSTEM

As previously stated, part of this study was devoted to investi
gation of the application of transfer pricing in a specific organization.
The purpose of this chapter will be to describe the organization by
examining (1) its'structure and circumstances within which it operates,
(2) the present control system, and (3) the inadequacy of the present
control system.

I*

SETTING OF THE CASE

The ABC Company is engaged in diversified operations within the
forest products industry.

It manufactures and sells many grades and

species of lumber and other related products.

Like most companies in

the industry, growth has been accomplished through integration.

This

company has production facilities for procuring the treesj sawing these
trees into rough green stock j finishing (drying and planing) the rough
green stockj and producing various wood products, such as mouldings and
lath.

Most of these functions are grouped into smaller organizational

units in the company (divisionalization), and therefore, raw materials
and products are being transferred from one operating unit to another
for farther processing.
The ABC Company has no forest land of its own, and therefore is
greatly dependent on federal timber offerings.

But this problem is

alleviated somewhat, because the sawmills of this company are located

19
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in different areas? this makes available more federal timber sales»
This study was limited to one operating unit of the company—a
sawmill.

This particular sawmill is located in an area in which pon-

derosa pine is prevalent, and -therefore it saws mainly this species.
The rough green stock from this mill is transferred to another location,
where it is mixed with stock from other sawmills and finished.

This

stock is presently transferred at cost, because there is no competitive
market price for green lumber of this species.

Certain species of rough

green stock do have market prices, but when pine is in this stage it
can not be readily used for anything, so no market price exists.

II.

PRESENT CONTROL SYSTEM

The present control system of this particular sawmill is based
on the expenses incurred to produce the rough green stock, and for this
reason we shall call it an expense center.

The characteristics of this

expense center ares
1.

It is a separate coordinated work group in the production
process.

2.

It is large enough to give sufficient cost detail.

3.

Authority has been delegated to a manager who is responsible
for costs and coordinating the activities of the center.

It should be emphasized that decentralization is present in this
sawmill.

Top management has delegated authority to the sawmill manager,

and he becomes the key figure in the control system.,

The manager has

authority over the resources used in producing the rough green stock,
namely, men, materials, and machinery and facilities»

A discussion of

each of these will be presented in the following paragraphs.
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The manager has fall control over the number of hourly personnel
employed.

If he feels additional laborers are needed to make his oper

ation more efficient, he has fall authority to employ them.

Supervisory

personnel are in some cases placed in the mill by top management, but
these situations are discussed with the manager beforehand.
Although the manager does not have complete control over the
prices paid for the logs sawed in the mill, he does have a considerable
amount of influence in this area.

Mien timber is up for bids, the man

ager accompanies the company buyers and together they bid on the timber.
All other materials used in the production process are under the com
plete control of the sawmill manager.
In the area of machinery and facilities, the manager serves as
the initiating factor.

Every six months, he makes out a capital budget

ing report which is submitted to the general manager of the company.
In this report the manager states what expenditures he feels are neces
sary to improve operations.

The general manager reviews this report

and decides which investments are reasonable.

If he cannot justify a

certain investment, the manager is told why it was rejected.

If the

sawmill manager is still not satisfied, he can resubmit it at a later
date with a more thorough analysis.

Reports on how well the new invest

ments are doing are kept by the sawmill manager and reviewed by the
general manager.

Although there is no well established cut-off point,

the manager does have authority to make small investment decisions
without home office approval.
Top management realizes that in delegating to the manager author
ity over a segment of the operations, it must measure accurately what
the manager spends and review and appraise his expenditures.

At the end
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of each month, expenses are totaled and evaluated by the general manager„
Mo standard, such as a budget, is used in which a manager mast operate,
or by which he is evaluated.

Instead, past monthly operating statements

of his and other company mills are used for comparison.

Some major ex

pense areas of other sawmills are very similar to this particular sawmill,
and for this reason can be used for comparison.

If any area seems to be

out of line, the general manager questions and discusses the trouble
spot with the sawmill manager so that corrective action can be taken,
if necessary.
In summary, the benefits which top management feels are achieved
in this expense center ares
1.

Cost information is compiled on a monthly basis so that the
manager can take corrective action in the event of trouble
areas.

2.

Cost information is made available for top management use in
controlling and planning the operation of the sawmill.

3.

Expenses are related to the person responsible for control
ling them.

Therefore, the manager is made cost conscious,

and will in most cases use the resources in the most effi
cient way.

III.

INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The performance of an operating unit may be measured in terms of
its effectiveness and efficiency.

Effectiveness relates to how well the

operating unit performs in relationship to the organization's goals
(such as profit), whereas efficiency is the amount of output per unit
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1

of input, which is usually compared to some standard.

An important

fact in the relationship between these two measures is that two oper
ating units can both have the same efficiency, but are not equally as
effective, as one unit may be producing more profit than the other (an
illustration will be provided below).
The present control system in the sawmill examined in this study
is based on expenses incurred.

Effectiveness cannot be measured in

financial terms in an expense center, because no attempt is made to
measure the value of the output.

Therefore, the sawmill is evaluated

on its efficiency, that is, how well its current operating expenses com
pare to its own and other company sawmills' past operating expenses.
Top management does not feel this is adequate, and they would like to
develop a system of information (control system) which measures both
effectiveness and efficiency.

If the sawmill could be changed to a

profit center, management's objective might be achieved.
To further explain the objective of profit measurement in this
sawmill, an example is presented in Illustration 1„

Illustration 1.

Measurement of Effectiveness and Efficiency.
Sawmill A

Sawmill B

Revenue
Cost

$ 9,000
6,000

$10,000
6,000

Profit

$ 3,000

$ U,000

No. of 1,000 bd. ft.
Cost per 1,000 bd. ft.
Profit per 1,000 bd. ft.

2,000
$ 3.00
1.50

2,000
$ 3.00
2.00

•'•Robert N. Anthony, "Note on Responsibility Centers," Management
Control Systems, Robert N. Anthony, John Dearden, and Richard P. 7ancil,
editors (Homewood, 111.; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 168.

Assume that both sawmills have the same investment and are operating at
capacity.
mills.

Suppose the company is planning on expanding one of these

If the performance of the sawmills is measured in terms of effi

ciency (cost per 1,000 bd. ft.) alone, the company would not be able to
decide in which mill to invest, because both sawmills are operating with
the same efficiency ($3).

However, if the performance of the sawmills

is measured by a profit center system, Sawmill B would be the logical
mill in which to invest.

Sawmill B is more effective, for it is produc

ing more profit per 1,000 board feet ($2), in comparison to Sawmill A
($1.50).

Profit, because it is related to and measures both effective

ness and efficiency, would serve as a guide in allocating future resources
between these sawmills.
The real difference between the two sawmills in the illustration
is that Sawmill B received more revenue for its product.

Assume that the

extra revenue Sawmill B received was due to the higher quality logs sawed
in this mill.

It might be said, that on the average each sawmill would

be paying more for higher quality timber, and therefore the profit per
1,000 board feet for each sawmill would on the average be the same.
However, this is not always the case, since federal timber sales are
sold through a competitive bidding system, and where there are very few
bidders, the sale price does not always reflect the quality of the tim
ber which is sold.
Where only one sawmill transfers its stock to a finishing unit
it would not be necessary to know how much profit the sawmill produces.
Such a sawmill could operate as a department or expense center within
the finishing unit, as the profit of the sawmill would be directly
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correlated with that of the finishing unit.

Bat in the ABC Company,

there is a situation where raore than one sawmill transfers its stock to
a finishing division.

This stock is mixed, due to order demands, which

makes it impossible to correlate the profit of the finishing division
with each individual sawmill.
pense center systems.

These sawmills are presently using ex

The ABC Company would like to maintain their

measure of efficiency, and in addition, desires to determine the ef
fectiveness, or profit, of each mill, as a guide for future resource
allocation among these mills.

Consequently, a profit center system is

deemed necessary.
The particular sawmill being examined in this study is of special
interest, in that the profit of this sawmill will probably be the most
difficult to measure as compared to the other mills.

As mentioned

earlier, this sawmill saws mainly ponderosa pine, which in its rough
green form has no established market price.

CHAPTER I?

INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE TRANSFER PRICING METHOD

The present transfer pricing method used to transfer rough green
stock, from the particular sawmill being examined, to a finishing divi
sion of the ABC Company is cost.

Under this method the sawmill can not

be evaluated as a profit center.

In order for profit to serve as a guide

in future sawmill resource allocation (objective of profit decentraliza
tion), it will be necessary to consider transfer pricing methods which
include profit in the transfer price.

This chapter is devoted to in

vestigating the feasibility of a competitive transfer pricing system,
but first, some characteristics of this proposed profit center will be
examined.

I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED PROFIT CENTER

The area the sawmill is located in has some effect on the profit
of the mill.

A mill which is located in an area where there are very

few other mills, and therefore probably very few bidders on federal
timber sales, might be able to buy timber at a price which does not
always reflect the quality of timber which is being sold.

The sawmill

manager would not have control over the number of other mills located
in his areaj consequently, he could not be held completely responsible
for the profit of the mill.

This characteristic would need to be con

sidered when home office management evaluates the sawmill manager.

26

27
The freedom for this proposed profit center to make sales outside
the company would be limited, because it will probably not hare an al
ternative market for its stock.

This situation is caused by a high

degree of integration in the forest products industry.

Today, many

companies have their own sawmills which fulfill their needed quota of
rough green stockj consequently, they do not need to purchase rough
green stock from other companies.
Home office management does not allocate general overhead to the
operating unitsj therefor, this would not be considered in the measure
ment of income of the proposed profit center.

Probably the most diffi

cult problem in income measurement, as mentioned in Chapter II, is
establishing a competitive transfer price.

Market based, cost plus a

fair return, and negotiated prices are transfer prices which include
profit, and for this reason will be discussed.

A market-based method

seems to be the only workable solution to this problem, although the
other methods will be discussed to show their shortcomings.

II.

POSSIBLE TRANSFER PRICING METHOD

Market prices for the rough green stock can probably be estimated
by subtracting from the price of the finished lumber those casts (and
profits) added after the logs have reached their rough green form.

In

this particular case, other factors will necessarily have to be consid
ered, and because information on these factors was not available at the
time of this study, a round-about approach was taken in setting the
transfer prices.

This procedure is somewhat different than the pro

cedure which could be used if the needed information was available and
which will be presented later,,
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In the round-about approach for setting transfer prices, the data
for a recent month of the sawmill was examined, along with the data at
the other sawmills transferring their stock to the same finishing divi
sion.

Only the data for the particular sawmill examined in this study

is presented in full detail.

During this month, the finishing division

received all the profit for the applicable sawmills, because the mills
transferred their stock at cost.

The profit the finishing division made

on this stock can only be estimated at around $32,000, because it did
not sell this stock during the month.

In the procedure used in this

study, this profit is allocated to where it was made (i.e., among both
the sawmills and the finishing division), by using transfer prices which
include profit.

In order to accomplish this, certain information which

was needed and not available had to be estimated, so that the total of
the allocated profit would be close to $32,000.
sults are presented in Table 1.^

The procedure and re

Only the sawmills need to follow the

procedure presented in Table I to arrive at their allocated profit.

The

finishing division's allocated profit will be available from the pro
cedure followed by the sawmills, for reasons which will be more apparent
later.
Columns A through M of the illustration are based on the differ
ent classifications of lumber sawed in each mill.

For instance, column

A is the number of 1,000 board feet of each classification sawed in the
sawmills during the month.
four or five grades.

These classifications may include as many as

The reason the rough green stock is placed in such

•'•Some of the procedure used in this approach was formed by the
Accounting Manager of the ABC Company.
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TABLE I
PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF MARKET-BASED TRANSFER PRICING
METHOD USED IN THIS STUDY
(1,000 bd„ ft.)

A
B
No. of *
Average
1,000 b.f. Finished
according
Price
to classi over
fication
Month
or grade
at sawmill
$
Sawmill #1
P.Pines
k/k Select
6/h Shop
h/h Common
6/k Common
Timbers

C
Gross
Sales

D
E
F
Net Sales Finishing Total
(After
Cost
Finishing
Plus
Cost
1.2%
discount)
Profit
(inc.
profit)
(AxB)
(AxE)

$

$

$

$

83-5
271.3
50.3
1*73.1*
15.8

162.11
95.12
67.80
81.55
75.00

13,536
25,803
3,1*10
38,605
1,185

12,561
23,91*5
3,161*
35,825
1,100

20.1|3
19.15
20»lt3
20.29
9.69

1,706
5,193
1,026
9,603
153

381.7
310.1

79.63
88.75

30,395
27,521

28,206
25,539

19 c 66
18.58

7,501*
5,762

lit.3
135.8

50.00
62.35

715
8,1*67

661*
7,857

22.1*7
ll*.25

321
1,935

1,736.3

11*9,638

138,861

33,203

3,715-9

312,808

290,281

63,236

Sub-total

1,180.1*

75,089

69,681

16,306

TOTAL

6,632.5

Spruces
h/h
3/6
White Fir:

1*A
8A
Sub-total
Sawmill #2
Sub-total
Sawmill #3

(Continued)
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Table I. (Continued)

J
G
H
I
K
L
M
Degrad- Total
Rough Green Loss
Total
Rough
Rough
ing
Stock Reve Due to Loss due
Degrad- Green
Green
nue Before Break
to
Factor
ing
Stock
Stock
Breakage &
age
Breakage
Factor Revenue Price
Degrading
(AxH)
(AxJ) (G-(I+K)) (L«A)

$
Sawmill #1
P.Pines
1*/l* Select
6/h Shop
I4./U Common
6/1* Common
Timber

$

$

$

$

$

$

10,855
18,752
2,138
26,222
91*7

6.51
3.1*5
2.12
2.76
2.97

51*3
938
107
1,311
1*7

3.90
2.07
2.12
2.76
1»77

326
563
107
1,311
28

9,986
17,251
1,967
21*,121*
872

119.60
63.59
39.11
50.96
55«19

20,702
19,777

2.71
3.28

1,035
989

2.71
3.28

1,035
989

19,01*6
18,195

1*9.90
58.67

31*3
5,922

1.18
2.17

17
296

1.18
2.17

17
296

309
5,330

21.61
39,25

1*,672

95,703

Spruces

1*A
3/6
White Firs
h/k
8/1*
Sub-total

105,658

5,283

227,01*5

15,893

53,375

2,587

Sawmill #2
Sub-total

16,51*3 191*,609

Sawmill #3
Sub-total

Revenue
Operating Cost
Profit

1,600

1*9,188

Sawmill #1

Sawmill #2

Sawmill #3

$ 95,703
91,611
$ 1*,092

$191*,605
l8l,lUt5
$ 13,160

$ 1*9,188
1*7,688
$ 1,500

Finishing Division
No. of 1,000 bd. ft.
6,632.5
Profit per 1,000 bd. ft. $
2.00
Profit
$ 13,265

TOTAL

$18,752

13,265
/

$32,017
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broad categories, is that it is very hard to determine the final grade
of lumber when it is in its rough green form.

By employing another

grader on each work shift it would be possible to grade this stock into
more categories, but still the grade given the stock at this state would
not be completely accurate for reasons discussed later.
Column B represents the average finished price over the month for
each classification.

This required averaging together the lumber prices

for each grade within the classification.

Finished lumber prices fluc

tuate widely, and consequently each grade price was also only an average.
Column C is the gross sales value of eaeh classification.

It is deter

mined by multiplying the number of 1,000 board feet times the average
price.

Column D is the net sales value for each classification.

This

is derived by subtracting the discount (7.2%) given the buyers from
the gross sales.
Column E represents the finishing cost plus profit for eaeh 1,000
board feet.

The finishing cost for each classification can be determined

quite accurately by the fijntsMnj^&s^fsien,,

The profit added to the

finishing cost was a fixed profit ($2.00 per 1,000 bd. ft.), as just
about all classifications go through the same finishing process„

Column

F is the total finishing cost (including profit) for each class ificatiom
This is determined by multiplying the number of 1,000 board feet times
the finishing cost plus profit.
Column G represents the rough green stock revenue before breakage
and degrading for each classification.

It is derived by subtracting the

total finishing cost plus profit from the net sales value.
Column H is the loss due to breakage for each classification.
Some of the rough green stock is broken in the finishing process.
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Consequently, the transfer prices of each 1,000 board feet would have to
reflect this loss, which is due to the nature of the product, and accord
ingly should be reduced.
each classification.

Column I is the total loss due to breakage for

This is determined by multiplying the number of

1,000 board feet times the loss due to breakage.
Column J is the degrading factor for each classification.

Degrad

ing is the monetary loss suffered due to the development of defects on
the rough green stock in the finishing process.

Although this problem

can be recognized, it is impossible to eliminate, as many of these defacts cannot be seen on the rough green stock.

For example, defects will

develop on some of the stock which was originally classified as k/h sel
ect, and consequently, this stock will have to be reclassified as h/h
common, and sold at a lower price. Column K is the total degrading
factor per number of 1,000 board feet.

This is derived by multiplying

the number of board feet in each classification times the degrading
factor.
It should be mentioned that both the loss due to breakage and the
degrading factor had to be estimated for each classification, as the
values for these factors were not available.

This is the reason why it

was necessary to use the round-about way to estimate the transfer prices.
In order to determine what these values would actually be, it would be
necessary to follow samples of each classification of stock through the
finishing process.

In most cases, these classifications will have dif

ferent values, and will probably vary in each mill0

When these values

are known, a much easier procedure can be used to estimate the transfer
prices.

This procedure will be presented later.
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Column L in the illustration is the rough green stock revenue for
each classification.

It is determined by adding the total loss due to

breakage to the total degrading factor, and subtracting this value from
the rough green stock revenue before breakage and degrading.
Column M is the transfer price for each category.

It is derived

by dividing the rough green stock revenue by the number of 1,000 board
feet.
The profit figures for each sawmill can be obtained by subtract
ing their operating cost from their rough green stock revenue (column L).
The operating cost for each sawmill during the month was, respectively,
$91,611, $l8l,lil*f>j and $1i7,688.

The respective profit for each mill

would then be $h,092, $13,160, and $1,^00.

The finishing division, as

mentioned earlier would make $2.00 per 1,000 board feet, and therefore,
its profit would be $13,266.

These four profit figures total to be

$32,017, which is very close to the estimate of what the profit would
have actually been ($32,000), if the finishing division sold only the
stock which was transferred during the month.
"When the values for the loss due to breakage and degrading factors
are established, a much simpler and somewhat different procedure than the
one used in this study can be used to estimate the transfer prices.

This

procedure is presented in Table II, along with a set of figures taken
from Table I, which serves as an example.
Finished lumber prices fluctuate widely, and for this reason must
be stabilized on a monthly or at least quarterly basis„

Weekly average

prices for each classification are made by the Western Wood Products
Association, and these could be used to arrive at a monthly average.
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TABLE II
MARKET-BASED TRANSFER PRICING METHOD

A
B
G
D
E
F
G
Lumber
Average Met Sales Finishing Rough Green Loss Degrad- Rough
Glassif- Finished Price
Cost
Stock Price Due to ing
Green
ications Price
(After
Plus
Before
Break- Factor
Stock
Over
1.2%
Profit
Breakage &
age
Price
Month
discount)
Degrading
C-(D+E)
3*
q>
*p
«p
tfi
<p
h/k Sel.

162.11

l^O.Uli

20oit3

130o01

6.$1

3.90

119.60

Consequently, the prices the sawmill could receive on its rough green
stock would not be determined until the end of each month.
The sawmill manager would be required to ship its rough green
stock as soon as it was finished.

If this were not the case, the sawmill

manager would be trying to maximize his profit by making transfers when
he thought the price would be high, and the finishing division manager
would be trying to maximize his profit by buying when he thought the
price would be low.

This would not be in the best interest of the com

pany, as in some instances finished lumber which was needed to meet order
demands might not be available.
The procedure in Table II would be followed each month.

Values

for the loss due to breakage and degrading factor would probably only
need to be changed when each sawmill began sawing logs from a new federal
timber sale.

The profit the mills would make each month would be put in

terms of the number of 1,000 board feet sawed.

This would give the three

sawmills a comparable measure, which over a period of time could be used
as a guide in future resource allocation,,
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At this point, it should be mentioned that if this system is used,
it would probably be beneficial to grade the stock into more categories,
rather than continuing with the present broad ones, especially if there
is a big difference between the prices of the grades in each category.
For example, a sawmill which transferred a great deal of high grade k/k
common would receive only the average price over all grades of k/h common
for this stock, if this present category was used, and this would not
reflect the quality of the logs coming from this sawmill.

To grade the

rough green stock into more categories would take more time, and conse
quently, another grader would have to be employed on each work shift.
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the defi
ciencies of the cost plus a fair return and negotiated transfer prices
would be discussed.

In the cost plus a fair return, it would still be

necessary to establish the loss due to breakage and the degrading factor
for each classification.

Also, it would be necessary to attach to the

different classifications of rough green stock, different profit mark
ups.

Presumably, these profit mark-ups would stay constant for each

classification, and in this case, this method would not recognize the
actual price fluctuations which occur on the finished lumber, and in
herently on the rough green stock.

Consequently, this method would dis

tort the profit performance of this sawmill.
Negotiated pricing would probably also distort the profit per
formance of this sawmill.

It was mentioned at the beginning of this

chapter that the forest products industry is highly integrated.

For

this reason, the sawmill and finishing division would probably have no
one else to negotiate with, for the sale or purchase of rough green

36
stock.

In this case, the transfer prices set might be biased toward

the operating unit with the most bargaining power.

Also, it would still

be necessary to establish the loss due to breakage and degrading factor
for each stock classification.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As business organizations have increased in size, the central
ized functional-type organization structure has been replaced in many
instances by divisionalization and decentralization.

In these organ

izations, an information system is needed to provide control over the
separate operating units.

The profit center system has gained increased

attention in recent years for two reasons?
1.

Profit measures both efficiency and effectiveness.

2.

Profit measurement can now be accomplished in many different
situations, by using the relatively new concept of transfer
pricing, whereas in the past it seemed impossible if compe
titive market prices did not exist.

The profit center system is being considered by the ABC Company
for these two reasons.

The objective of profit measurement in the saw

mill is to measure its effectiveness, and to accomplish this objective,
transfer prices which include profit sere required.

Naturally, transfer

prices need not be completely accurate, for when they are applied to
improve management control, the desired result can still be obtained as
long as they reasonably approximate market prices.

Transfer prices

which include profit happen to be particularly hard to arrive at in the
case of this industry.

A market-based pricing method seems to be the

feasible solution to the problem.
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In conclusion, it will be necessary to evaluate this transfer
pricing method and profit center system, in terras of the costs required
to implement and use such a system, versus the return it gives of better
control.

The major costs which must be considered ares

(1) hiring

another grader on each work shift, which would enable the rough green
stock to be classified into more categories, and (2) following the rough
green stock through the finishing process to determine the degrading and
loss due to breakage factors.

The return this profit center would give

would provide better control over the allocation of future resources
among the sawmills.
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